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AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE:
JENSEN VS. POORE
Readers unfamiliar with Indian law will miss a lively
debate if they pass over the articles that follow. To orient those
readers, we offer this brief overview.
Last winter, we published an article by James A. Poore, III,
entitled The Constitution of the United States Applies to Indian
Tribes.' No one doubts that the federal government is bound by
the Constitution when it deals with individuals who are
members of Indian tribes. But Mr. Poore raised a different
matter: does (or should) the Constitution bind tribes in their
governmental dealings with non-members? With their own
members? The standard view, represented in this issue by
Professor Erik M. Jensen, is that the Constitution does not bind
Indian tribes. The tribes pre-exist the Constitution, they never
signed it or swore to abide by it as the States did, and the
federal government has never ceased to recognize tribes'
existence, at least to some extent. Mr. Poore argues that the
United States' territorial, military, and political ascendancy
terminated the tribes' pre-constitutional existence and launched
them into a new era, so that they now exist entirely at the
sufferance of Congress; consequently, Poore concludes, they
must be bound by the same document that binds Congress.
Mr. Poore's argument is directed at the doctrine of "retained
sovereignty," the principle that the tribes still have some
inherent authority which is neither created nor bound by
Congress, the courts, or the Constitution. Under this doctrine,
Congress' relations with the tribes are governed by the
Constitution, not because tribes must respect the Constitution,
but because Congress must.
Retained sovereignty is significantly limited by its doctrinal
opposite, Congress' "plenary power" over Indian affairs. This
power is given to Congress by the Constitution and by Chief
Justice Marshall's interpretation of it in the three foundational
1. 59 MoNT. L. REV. 51 (1998).
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cases of Indian law.2 Retained sovereignty under the plenary
power doctrine might be compared to the clever, three-legged pig
under the farmer's care:
"That pig sounds the alarm when the weasel comes to kill all
the chickens. He milks all the cows and watches the kids when we
go out in the fields. And he rescued me and my family when our
house caught on fire."
"But why does your pig have a wooden leg?"
"Why, you wouldn't eat a wonderful pig like that! Not all at
once!"
The authors agree that retained sovereignty is subject to
limitation or defeasance by Congress and the courts, but they
disagree as to the true extent of tribal sovereignty's actual and
potential limitation. Poore insists that tribal sovereignty simply
is not on all fours with respect to normative conceptions of
sovereignty. Congress or the courts could do away with it at any
moment; indeed, Poore argues that both Congress and the courts
have an obligation to enforce the Constitution against the tribes,
whether such enforcement infringes on tribal sovereignty or not.
Jensen insists that retained sovereignty, despite its truncation,
is alive and well, with a reasonably favorable prognosis. Even if
the courts interpreted the Constitution to permit Congress to
eliminate tribal sovereignty - a doubtful proposition for most
Indian law scholars - Congress' active promotion of tribal self-
government indicates that it will not do so.
In a larger sense, the debate here concerns the proper
balance of logic and history in constitutional interpretation.
Does logic trump history so decisively that Congress cannot
undertake to protect historically pre-federal entities like Indian
tribes, as Poore suggests? Or does history give rise to a logic of
its own, so that the tribes occupy a special status which the
Constitution requires Congress to respect, as Jensen proposes?
Is constitutional logic to be derived from the United States'
history of conquest or the tribes' history of survival?
Read the articles, and judge for yourself.
2. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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